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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Olympus has, for the most part, skirted the arguments
made in Wasatch's opening brief*
one

of

ignoring

the

lower

entitled to win and did.
well" may work

Its philosophy appears to be

court's

errors, since

it feels

To argue that "all's well that ends

if an error

is harmless, but here the lower

court's errors put Wasatch out of business.
The case was based originally on the unlawful detainer
statute.

The court erred in evicting Wasatch when the statute

no longer applied, and since whether the contract provides for
eviction is an unresolved question of fact.
Requiring two $300,000 supersedeas bonds was a clear
abuse of discretion, which put Wasatch out of business pending
this appeal.

ARGDMENT

1.

Amendment cannot turn an unlawful detainer action

into one at common law.

Olympus' argument on this issue is

mostly a pitch for the greater ease caused by allowing amendment
of its unlawful detainer complaint.

Olympus also argues that

Wasatch was not prejudiced, despite the fact that commencing a
new action would have given an opportunity for a hearing on the
- 1 -

amount owed and an opportunity to cure before eviction.
is no argument
a.

There

proffered to rebut the facts that:

Jurisdiction was obtained by a complaint limited to

statutory unlawful detainer, with a three day notice.
b.
c.

A year passed after the three days expired.
Only $17,000 was claimed as due in the three day

notice and complaint, and more than that was paid before summary
judgment was eventually granted a couple of years later.
d.

The judgment was based upon a letter agreement

entered into and allegedly breached a year after the three days
to cure expired.
e.

No eviction clause was contained in the letter

agreement, which ran for a definite term of two years.

See

Appellant's Brief, Appendix II.

2.
whether

This

Wasatch

question

was

is

prejudiced

jurisdictional.
by

the

court

Therefore,
allowing

the

amendment is beside the point.
Since the action of unlawful detainer

is a special

statutory proceeding, summary in its nature, and in derogation
of the common law, the statute is what confers jurisdiction.
See, Chapter 36, Title 78, Utah Code; 35 AmJur 2d Forcible Entry
& Detainer § 33.
Those statutes must therefor be strictly construed, or
jurisdiction will fail to attach, and the proceeding will be
- 2 -

coram non judice and void.

Schroeder v. Woody, 166 Or. 93, 109

P.2d 597, 599-600 (1941); 35 AmJur 2d Forcible Entry & Detainer
§ 33, n. 5, and cases there cited; Color-Ad Packaging, Inc. v.
Kapak Industries, Inc., 285 Minn. 525, 172 NW2d 568, ovrld. on
other grounds, Township Board of Lake Valley Township v. Lewis,
234 NW2d 815 (court without jurisdiction to enter judgment in
unlawful detainer action where return date of summons was less
than the three days required by statute) .
The court

in an unlawful

detainer

action does not

proceed as a court of general jurisdiction, but derives its
authority wholly from the statute.
special and limited jurisdiction.
no authority

So it becomes a court of
Id.

So the lower court had

to allow amendment of the action into one for

common law restitution.

Other rights, such as those sounding in

equity, are not included in such an action.

See, 35 AmJur 2d

Forcible Entry & Detainer § 33, n. 5, and cases there cited.

3.

Execution of the letter agreement is an issue of

fact preventing

summary

judgment.

In the Amended Complaint

Olympus admitted the parties entered into the letter agreement
(11 5) , and alleged a default under that agreement (% 6) .
89-92.

R.

A copy of the agreement, fully executed by both Olympus

and Wasatch, was even attached as Exhibit A and incorporated by
reference into the Amended Complaint.

R. 92.

A copy of the

letter is attached as Appendix II to the opening brief.
- 3 -

Nevertheless, faced with the fact the letter agreement
seems to supersede for its two year term the default provisions
of the leasef Olympus now disputes the validity of the letter
agreement because "the parties were never able to agree whether
the percentage

rent in paragraph 1 was monthly or annual."

Response Br. p. 6; see also p. 13, § II.
Of

course

percentage was

the

annual

ambiguities

or monthly

(such

as

and whether

whether
default

the
could

result in restitution) would be construed against Olympus since
its predecessor in interest drafted the agreement.

Hoffman v.

Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983).

But

aside from that, the uncertainty asserted points out that issues
of fact existed, precluding

summary

judgment under Rule 56,

URCP.

4.

Effect

of letter

agreement

question, precluding summary judgment.
Wasatch's opening brief

is another

factual

Olympus mistakenly read

to allege that the letter agreement

stated there would be no forfeiture clause.

Response Br. at 13.

Actually, Wasatch pointed out that the letter superseded the
lease,

and

incorporate

contained
(by

no

forfeiture

reference

or

clause.

otherwise)

Nor
the

did

it

forfeiture

provisions of the lease.
Of
original

course

Olympus

lease somehow

asserts

survived
_ 4_

the

remedies

the letter

under

agreement.

the
This

position of Olympus requires evidence and a factual finding.

A

conflict as to the terms the parties intended to include in an
agreement presents a factual question for the jury.

Hays v.

Underwood, 411 P.2d 717, 720-721, 196 Kan. 265 (1966).
Moreover, the Court's Order of Partial Summary Judgment
doesn't even state the authority for the eviction.

See Appendix

IV, Opening

Brief.

It appears Olympus itself

is not sure

whether

claimed

entitlement

its

to eviction

is based

upon

statute, the terms of the letter agreement, the lease, or some
common law source.
opening brief.
question.

This was pointed out by Wasatch in its

P. 3.

Yet Olympus still has not cleared up the

Without

a forfeiture clause, Olympus' remedy was

limited to damages.

Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Utah

1982) .

5.

The

summary

judgment.

whether

payments

issue

of partial

Section
it accepted

III

of

payments

also precludes

Olympus' brief

from Wasatch

after

disputes

the letter

agreement was signed are properly discussed on appeal.

In doing

so, Olympus unwittingly illustrates why eviction was not proper
without a trial.

Olympus states, "Wasatch occasionally made

payments toward old obligations to Olympus.

However, Wasatch

never became current in its lease payments."

Response Br. p.

15.

How can Olympus make such an admission, and deny existence

of an issue of fact.
- 5 -

In fact/ summary judgment as to damages has now been
sought by Olympus at the trial court level.
heard a week ago.

The motion was

The question of partial payments and credits

was so much an issue, the motion was denied (without prejudice)
and

Olympus

was

required

renewing its motion.

to

provide

an

accounting

before

The uncertainty of the facts, and close

correlation between eviction and damages (treated in Section 6,
below) are again illustrated by Olympus in its brief: "If this
court determines that, due to the remaining claims for rent and
attorneys fees, the eviction judgment was not a final judgment
for the purposes of executing the judgment, Olympus is willing
to waive its claim for the rent due."

6.

Response Br. p. 18.

Olympus ignores the notice issue.

in sections 5 and 7 of Wasatch's brief.

This was treated

pp. 3-5.

Olympus may

not summarily evict Wasatch without complying with very specific
statutory notices and demands.
"after default".

These notices must be served

§ 78-36-3(1)(c), Utah Code.

No further action

can be taken until three days "after" the notice is served.
Yet eviction was allowed

Id.

here although a new agreement was

entered into long after the original notices.

No new notices

were served after any new breach.

7.

Multiple claims were not stated.

Olympus asserts

(Br. p. 15-17) that because more than one kind of relief was
-- 6 -

sought,

a

Rule

restitution

54(b)

URCP

certification

only was permissible.

of

the

writ

of

However, the fact

remains

that the complaint was stated as one claim for relief.

And it

is particularly inappropriate to allow certification of part of
the

case

in

this

instance,

where

the

legal

basis

for

restitution is far from clear.
Even when the trial court certifies a claim under Rule
54(b),

this

does

not

make

the

order

appealable

as

a

final

decision if only a single claim is presented in the case and the
order does not dispose of the entire case.

Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 47 L.Ed. 2d 435, 96 S.Ct. 1202
(1976); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S.
1, 64 L.Ed. 2d 1, 100 S.Ct. 1460 (construing the federal rules
54(b)

corollary).

Here only one breach

multiple remedies are sought.

is claimed

and and

The identical facts apply to each

remedy.
While, for purposes of FRCP 54(b), a separate
claim need not be predicated on acts entirely
distinct from those on which other claims are
based, there must be some variation in the facts
required to establish each separate claim, and
the facts underlying each claim must stated
different legally enforceable claims which could
have been separately enforced, since if only one
set of facts is alleged, a mere variation in
legal theories in insufficient to give rise to
several claims.
2 Fed. P r o c ,

L. Ed. § 3:323

cases there cited.

(authorities omitted);

"Rule 54(b) is identical

respects to the corresponding

federal

- 7 -

and

see

in all material

rule, and in construing

our rules, we look to authorities which have interpreted the
federal rule."

Allen Steel Co. v. Crossroads Plaza Associates,

119 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 9 (S.Ct. 1989).
A finding

of liability which reserves the issue of

damages is not appealable, even though the trial judge certified
it as such.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 47

L.Ed. 2d 435, 96 S.Ct. 1202

(1976).

Certification does not

confer jurisdiction on the Court unless a claim is actually and
wholly

disposed

of.

Allen

Steel

Co. v. Crossroads

Plaza

Associates, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 9 (S.Ct. 1989).
Olympus challenges Wasatch

(p. 17) to point to some

reason why there is a just reason for delay.

Of course throwing

Wasatch out of its bowling alley without a determination of its
default more than sufficient reason.
rule

should

be

used

only

in

In fact, the certification

an

infrequent,

harsh

case.

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F.2d 360,
32 ALR Fed. 751
hardship

or

(CA4 1975).

injustice

certified for appeal.
F.2d 939 (CA2 1968).
appeals.

There must be some danger of

through

delay

if

the

case

were not

Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 403
Judicial policy dictates against piecemeal

2 Fed. Proc, L. Ed. § 3:324.

8.
execution.

Wasatch's supersedeas bond entitled it to a stay of
Wasatch argued extensively in its opening brief (pp.

8 through 12) that the trial court erred in:
- 8 -

a.

Requiring

a

surety

of

$300,000

to

stay

in

possession of the bowling alley pending appeal when annual rent
is only about $30,000,
b.

Requiring two sureties rather than one, each for

$300,000 (the maximum amount sought by Olympus), and
C.

Failing to stay execution though one of the two

bonds was approved.
Yet Olympus responds in three paragraphs, merely by saying the
court did not approve the bonds so a stay was not required.
Response Br. pp. 18, 19.
should

the

court

have

Of course this begs the question:

refused

to

find

the

sureties

were

adequate?
As Wasatch pointed out, the record indicates the bond
of $300,000 was approved by the lower court.
Olympus denies, without
Response Br. 18.
refused

to

stay

support

or

citation

Wasatch's understanding
execution

because

R. 243-244.

a

This

to the record.

is that the court

second

bond

was

not

approved, since the surety was unavailable for cross-examination
on the appointed day.

R.

156-159 ($50,000 bond filed), R.

177-178 ($100,000 bond approved, subject to justification), R.
189-193 (two $300,000 bonds filed), 205-207 (two $300,000 bonds
required), R. 243

(court approves of bonds filed, but allows

time for filing of corporate bonds), R. 244 (vague entry finding
the two $300,000 bonds "acceptable" but ordering defendant to
"post a surety bond of $300,000" or the writ of restitution
- 9 -

would be granted), R. 257

(Writ of Restitution served)*

Of

course two such bonds had already been posted.
The record is difficult to decipher with relation to
the bond proceedings.

Since the lower court refused a stay of

execution/ it was Olympus1 responsibility to prepare a written
order making the judge's findings and holdings clear.

It is

impossible to tell from the minute entries exactly what occurred
or for what reason.
As Wasatch pointed out in its opening brief (p. 11-12)/
the supersedeas bond may include only such sum as will secure
the

"amount

recovered

for

the use and determination

of the

property, the costs of the action, costs to appeal/ interest,
and damages for delay."

Former Rule 73(d)/ URCP (1984).

The

court made no findings to reach the $300/000/ a figure ten times
the amount of a year's rent of the premises.

Yet two bonds in

that amount were required.

9.

The bankruptcy order did not affect this case. Yet

Olympus apperas in section VI of its brief to make an argument
akin to res judicata or collateral estoppel.
without reference to any authority.

Yet it does so

Response Br. pp. 19-20.

In the midst of the eviction/ Wasatch filed a bankruptcy
which was later dismissed.

Olympus has attached two orders of

Bankruptcy Judge Glen E. Clark/ and has argued that they somehow
signify a permanent termination of the leasehold independent of
- 10 -

this action.

Response Br. pp. 19-20; orders attached as Exhibits

D and E.
It is worthy of note that the two bankrtuptcy orders
both followed the appeal in this matter, which was filed about
June 13, 1989.
precedence

An act of the bankruptcy court cannot take
the

issue of

whether the lease was terminated is a state law issue.

It would

be

unwise

over

to

this appeal, particularly when

appeal

the

bankruptcy

decision

when

the same

question is already on appeal in this Court.
The June 28, 1989 order (Olympus1 Exhibit D) was merely
one

for

temporary

relief.

It held

"on the sole basis that

[Olympus] will suffer irreparable and immediate injury, loss or
damage", that Olympus could complete its state court action for
a writ of

restitution.

P. 2.

The August 8, 1989 order

(Olympus' Exhibit E) simply

observes what the trial court in this case had done: to issue of
% 2, 4.

writ of restitution and terminate the lease.
Clark

is

in

essence

deferring

to

the

trial

court

Judge
judge's

finding, not making a factual finding of his own.
After making the observations about the state court's
prior

holdings, Judge

Clark

orders

only

"that

the

creditor

Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. is granted relief from the
stay

to

pursue

its

state-law

remedies with

premises known as the Wasatch Bowling Lanes."

- 11 -

respect

to the

Olympus' Exhibit

E,

p.

3

(emphasis

supplied).

The

language

of

the order

certainly does not sound like an attempt to override the state
court action.

This appeal represents

the efforts of both sides

to pursue those state remedies.

10.

Olympus is not entitled to attorney fees. This is

true even if the Court were to somehow find against Wasatch on
every issue.

Rule 33(a) , R. Utah Ct. App. requires a finding

that the appeal is more than meritless.

It must be frivolous.

O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987).

It must

have "no reasonable or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a)."
Id.

It must be marked by dilatory conduct or conduct designed

to mislead the court and which benefits only the appellant.
Olympus has not shown (and cannot) such conduct on the part of
Wasatch here.

Olympus does make some bald assertions, without

support by any record, of acts it believes Wasatch committed
"harass" Olympus.

Response Br. pp. 20-21.

to

None of the acts is

relevant to the appeal, however.
Wasatch

believes

entitled to prevail.

its arguments have merit, and are

This appeal is not a mere effort to harass

or delay, and is brought in good faith.

Sanctions for frivolous

appeals should be applied only in egregious cases, to avoid
chilling the right to appeal erroneous lower court decision.
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

- 12 -

CONCLUSION
Having

started

as

an

unlawful

detainer

action,

the

lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in evicting Wasatch on a
common

law

basis.

letter

agreement

Issues
of

the

of

fact

parties

remain

even

as to whether

including

an

the

eviction

provision.
Separate remedies do not constitute separate causes of
action which can be certified for a piecemeal appeal.
trial

court

abused

its

discretion

in

requiring

And the

two

$300,000

supersedeas bonds to stay execution pending this appeal.
Wasatch asks that the trial court's ruling be reversed,
and that it be required to restore

Wasatch to possession of the

bowling alley.

Respectfully

so

requested

this

20th

day

of

February,

1990.

Ronald C. Barker
Mitchell R. Barker
Attorneys for Appellant
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